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Franklin: When Domestic Violence and Sex-Based Discrimination Collide: Civi

WHEN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SEXBASED DISCRIMINATION COLLIDE: CIVIL
RIGHTS APPROACHES TO COMBATING
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND ITS AFTERMATH
By ERICA FRANKLIN*

"It is still easier to convict a car thief than a rapist, and, authorities are more likely to arrest a man for parking tickets than for
beating his wife. . .

-Then-Senator
States

.,,

Joseph Biden, Vice President of the United

The folkways of a society are not the highest ideals of a people.
The folkways are, instead, the everyday beliefs and accepted
truths that guide our lives. There is a constant effort by all members of our society, conscious and unconscious, to accommodate,
in a gradual adjustment, the folkways to [our highest ideals].
The law often steps in to catalyze the process of adaptation. We
saw this with the turmoil of the desegregation cases. At this
point in our history, we are now encountering a parallel adapta2
tion phase involving gender-based discrimination.
-Judge Goldberg, Circuit Judge
* Erica Franklin completed her bachelor's degree at Yale University in 2005
and her law degree at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law
in 2010. As a law student, she worked at the Legal Aid Society-Employment
Law Center in the Domestic Violence and Employment Project, and she participated in the Domestic Violence Practicum. She is currently a law clerk at
the Washington State Supreme Court. She is grateful to Professors Nancy
Lemon, Herma Hill Kay, and Goodwin Liu and to practitioners Anya
Lakner, Sharon Terman, and Meliah Schultzman for valuable feedback and
assistance.

1 137 CONG. REC. S598 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1991) (statement of Sen. Biden).
2 McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 426-27 (5th Cir. 1989) (Goldberg,
J., dissenting).
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INTRODUCTION

For many survivors of domestic violence, oppression extends
far beyond the domicile. Myriad forms of discrimination, by
state and private actors alike, add insult to injury. Calls to the
police may fall on deaf ears, as police departments often make
exceptions for violence that takes place between intimate partners.3 In the workplace, pink slips often follow the disclosure of
a domestic violence situation. A domestic violence survivor may
land on the streets when her landlord learns of her abusive relationship. While civil rights protections by no means offer a panacea to combat the discriminatory treatment of domestic
violence survivors, they are, in many respects, a promising avenue for redress and reform.
Domestic violence is defined as a pattern of abusive behavior
within a relationship that allows one partner to exert power and
control over the other. Such behavior may serve to isolate, humiliate, manipulate, intimidate, terrorize, coerce, blame, or injure a survivor. Domestic violence can take the form of actions
or threats of action and can be physical, sexual, emotional, psy4
chological, or economic in nature.
This Comment explores the potential for successful challenges
to discrimination against domestic violence survivors in three
arenas: police nonintervention, employment, and housing. This
undertaking requires close analysis of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and the Fair Housing Act respectively. It
argues that the struggles of female, heterosexual domestic violence survivors in each of these arenas are amenable to civil
Similarly, when police officers do make arrests in domestic violence cases,
they often arrest the victim rather than the perpetrator. Such practices, while
highly problematic, are outside the scope of this Comment.
3

4

Office of Violence Against Women: About Domestic Violence, U.S. DE-

PARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/domviolence.htm.
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rights challenges, because all of these struggles are, at heart, a
form of sex-based discrimination.
Because heterosexual domestic violence is a means by which
men subordinate women, and because society has yet to abandon the misogynistic norms under which domestic violence
thrives, institutional actors often facilitate domestic violence
rather than repudiate it. Furthermore, because women comprise
the lion's share of domestic violence survivors, they bear the
brunt of policies and practices in civil society that amount to
collateral consequences of domestic violence. In short, society
turns a blind eye to domestic violence survivors because they
are women, and because women are disproportionately represented among domestic violence survivors, they are at a serious
disadvantage in civil society. Thus, civil rights interventions are
in high demand.
Empirical evidence suggests that heterosexual domestic violence has a strong basis in sex. For example, rigid adherence to
norms of male dominance and superiority is one of the primary
individual and sociocultural risk factors for family violence.5 Indeed, a comprehensive, multi-state study revealed higher rates
of wife abuse in states with strong patriarchal norms. 6 On the
international front, research by anthropologist David Levinson
reveals that societies with little or no family violence have
strong indicators of gender equality, including egalitarian decision-making in domestic affairs, shared control of family resources, and egalitarian laws governing divorce and pre-marital

5 AMERICAN

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE,

18 (1996).
MURRAY A. STRAUS, Patriarchyand Violence Against

VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY

6 KERSTI

A.

YLLO &

Wives: The Impact of Structural and Normative Factors, in PHYSICIAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES 383, 395 (Murray A. Straus & Richard J.
Gelles eds., 1995).
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sex. 7 Levinson found non-egalitarian domestic decisionmaking
to be a reliable predictor of intimate violence directed at wives.8
Heterosexual domestic violence is also a function of gender
inequality on the individual level. Domestic violence is widely
recognized as a means of exerting power and control, 9 and as
such, it often stems directly from power discrepancies and patriarchal values. Indeed, in one study, men in batterers' treatment
cited gender-based, power-seeking motives, such as the desire to
exert control over the woman, the desire to structure and control a relationship, and the belief that female independence is at
odds with male control.10 In another study, which involved comprehensive interviews with former male batterers, 78% of the
participants believed their behavior was justified because their
wives had not lived up to stereotypical expectations, such as
cooking well, being available for sex, and behaving deferentially
towards their husbands.1
The highly disparate rates at which men and women are subjected to domestic violence also evince the sex-based nature of
this phenomenon. Research indicates that 90 to 95%of domestic
violence victims are women. 12 One high-profile, national study
indicated that 92% of the victims of heterosexual violence were
women. 13 Another survey revealed about 554,000 female victims
7 DAVID LEVINSON, FAMILY VIOLENCE IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

102-07 (Sage Publications 1987).
8 Id.
9 Power and Control Wheel, DOMESTIC ABUSE INTERVENTION PROJECT,
http://www.theduluthmodel.org/documents/PhyVio.pdf.
10 DONALD G. DUTTON, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL & CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 64 (1995).
11 James Ptacek, Why do Men Batter Their Wives?, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 133, 147 (Kersti Yllo & Michelle Bograd, eds.1988).
12 U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

-

VIOLENCE

BETWEEN

INTIMATES

2 (1994),

available at http://

bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vbi.pdf.
13 PATRICIA TJADEN

&

NANCY THOENNES, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUS-

TICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES

OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

46 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/

pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf.
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and 69,000 male victims of violent crime by an intimate partner
in 2007.14 The discrepancy between male and female victimization is wider for more severe violence. 15 Women are 13 times
more likely than men to receive injuries from domestic violence. 16 The rate of female homicide victims killed by their husbands or boyfriends is more than twice that of male homicide
victims killed by their girlfriends or wives.17
Despite the strong correlation between gender inequality and
domestic violence, research indicates that domestic violence
among same-sex couples is about as prevalent as that among
heterosexual couples.18 Thus, while heterosexual domestic violence is largely a sex-based phenomenon, sex does not fully account for domestic violence, particularly when it occurs in samesex couples. Moreover, while women account for 90 to 95% of
domestic violence victims, 19 men certainly may be victims of domestic violence as well.
However, with some exceptions, the civil rights challenges discussed in this Comment apply by their very nature only to female survivors of domestic violence-an inevitable limitation of
the approach for which this Comment advocates. In addition, to
the extent that discrimination against domestic violence survivors stems from a covert acceptance of male-on-female bat14

U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU

OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,

TIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION,

NA-

2007 6

(2008), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv07.pdf.

Kathleen Basile, Iliana Arias, Sujata Desai, & Martie P. Thompson, The
Differential Association of Intimate Partner Physical, Sexual, Psychological,
and Stalking Violence and Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms in a Nationally
Representative Sample of Women, 17 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 413, 413 (2004).
16 VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY, supra note 5, at 14.
17 C. Quince Hopkins, Rescripting Relationships: Toward a Nuanced Theory
of Intimate Violence as Sex-based Discrimination,9 VA J. SOC. POL'Y & L.
411, 450-51 (2001).
18 Domestic Violence in Gay and Lesbian Relationships, AN ABUSE, RAPE,
15

AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AID AND RESOURCE COLLECTION,

http://www.

aardvarc.org/dv/gay.html.
19 CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION,
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tering, claims of intentional sex-based discrimination will be
more useful to women in heterosexual relationships and presumably, more relevant to this population. In contrast, disparate
impact claims in the employment context, discussed infra, apply
regardless of sexual orientation. Similarly, claims of discrimination against domestic violence survivors as such, discussed with
reference to police intervention, are gender-neutral. In sum, it is
important to recognize that civil rights approaches to the collateral consequences of domestic violence are not universally applicable and do not purport to be a panacea, but rather, are
useful only insofar as the oppression of domestic violence survivors in civil society constitutes sex-based discrimination.
In 2000, in a major defeat to domestic violence survivors and
their advocates, the Supreme Court struck down the Civil
Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),20
the first national attempt to bring civil rights protections to bear
on domestic violence. 21 In the wake of its demise, alternative
civil rights approaches are well worth pursuing, not least on account of their normative and expressive appeal. By reframing
discrimination against domestic violence survivors as discrimination against women, advocates not only leverage the legal protections against sex-based discrimination but also help
underscore the gravity of the challenged discrimination. For example, employment practices that place domestic violence survivors at a disadvantage are arguably more alarming when viewed
in the aggregate, as a set of practices that seriously impact employment opportunities for women.
Civil rights challenges can play an educational role as well.
Domestic violence is alive and well today due in large part to its
widespread acceptance. For example, in the wake of extensive
media coverage of pop star Rihanna's abusive relationship with
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2007).
21 See Julie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in
the Name of Federalism, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 110 (2000).
20
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fellow celebrity Chris Brown, nearly half of the teens surveyed
by the Boston Public Health Commission responded that
Rihanna was at fault for the severe violence she experienced at
the hands of her boyfriend. 22 In recasting police nonintervention
as a form of illicit gender discrimination, bold judicial decisions
in police nonintervention cases can help to lay bare the subtle
discrimination underlying widely accepted distinctions between
intimate and non-intimate violence. Thus, rather than waiting
for the complete demise of discriminatory social constructs,
courts can help bring about such a demise by exposing and interrogating deeply entrenched social norms.
In addition, a renewed focus on the civil rights component of
domestic violence law makes sense from a practical standpoint.
Criminal justice interventions, such as restraining orders issued
by criminal courts and no-drop prosecution policies, are only
useful if the police departments charged with enforcing domestic violence prohibitions actually do so and hold perpetrators responsible. Similarly, domestic violence survivors are hardpressed to seek help in the workplace when they fear they will
be penalized for their domestic violence status. Nor can a domestic violence survivor be expected to leave her batterer once
she has lost a source of income or the roof over her head.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. First, it discusses the
viability of Equal Protection challenges when police fail to intervene in domestic violence incidents, all too often with lethal
consequences. While the weight of authority cuts against such an
approach, this Comment argues that Equal Protection approaches in this arena are well worth re-exploring, in light of the
Supreme Court's recent rejection of a substantive and procedural due process challenge to police nonintervention. 23 Next, this
Comment turns to employment and highlights creative avenues
22

Media Release, Boston Public Health Commission, Public Health Com-

mission Surveys Youth on Dating Violence (Mar. 12, 2009), available at http:/
/www.bphc.org/Newsroom/Pages/TopStoriesView.aspx?ID=60.
23

Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
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for Title VII sex-based harassment, disparate impact, and disparate treatment claims, relying on precedent within and outside
the employment arena. Finally, it explores possibilities for challenges to discriminatory housing policies under the Fair Housing
Act, arguing that this statute can be used to combat both evictions and denials of safety transfers to domestic violence
survivors.
II.

POLICE NONINTERVENTION

In 1999, a resident of Castle Rock, Colorado named Jessica
Lenahan (then Jessica Gonzales) obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) on behalf of herself and her three young
daughters when she entered into divorce proceedings with her
abusive husband. 24 Shortly thereafter, in flagrant violation of the
restraining order, Ms. Lenahan's husband abducted the children
from her home. 25 That evening, Ms. Lenahan called the Castle
Rock Police Department, entreating the officers to enforce her
TRO and return her daughters. 26 But rather than taking swift
action at her request, the officers told Ms. Lenahan to call again
27
at ten o'clock if her husband had not returned the children.
Meanwhile, Ms. Lenahan received a call from her husband, who
told her that he had taken the girls to an amusement park in
another county. 28 Immediately-and repeatedly thereafter-Ms.
Lenahan called the police department, only to be told to call
again later, even though ten o'clock had come and gone. 29 At
12:10 a.m., Ms. Lenahan was told an officer would come to her
house, but no one came. 30 Nearly an hour later, she went to the
24

Id. at 751.

25

Id. at 753.

26

29

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

30

Id.

27
28
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police station and submitted an incident report herself. 3t But
rather than taking steps to locate the missing children, the32 officer who responded to the incident report left for dinner.
Hours later, Ms. Lenahan's husband appeared at the Castle
Rock police station and opened fire on the police, who shot
back and killed him. 33 Ms. Lenahan's three young daughters
34
were found dead in the back of Mr. Gonzales' pickup truck.
In 2001, Ms. Lenahan sued the town of Castle Rock in United
States District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging substantive and procedural due process violations. 35 When Defendants prevailed on a motion to dismiss, Ms. Lenahan appealed,
and the Tenth Circuit ruled in her favor. 36 However, in a 7-2
decision in 2005, the Supreme Court reversed, relying heavily on
a previous decision, Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department
of Social Services, in which it held that the failure of child protection officials to prevent serious child abuse did not violate the
child's substantive due process rights and that no violation of
procedural due process had occurred. 37 In addition, the Court's
reading of the governing Colorado statute was deeply at odds
with the statutory text; while the statute stated that officers
"shall" make arrests for restraining order violations, the Court
held that such arrests were discretionary. 38
Relentless in her pursuit of justice, Ms. Lenahan has turned to
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR),

31

Id. at 753-54.

32

Id. at 754.

33 Id.
34 Id.

Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, No. 00-D-1285, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26018 (D. Colo. Jan. 22, 2001).
36 Gonzalez v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1118 (10th Cir. 2004).
37 Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748, 769 (2005) (citing to Deshaney v.
Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989)).
38 Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 761.
35
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an international human rights body. 39 Though likely to be influential, the IACHR's recommendations, which are pending at the
time of writing, will not be binding on the United States.
Castle Rock dealt a decisive blow to domestic violence survivors whose calls for police protection go unanswered. In particular, it shut the door to due process claims against police officials
whose inaction in response to domestic violence calls results in
injury or death.
In the wake of Castle Rock, Equal Protection arguably remains a viable approach for survivors in Ms. Lenahan's shoes,
and is likely the only viable pathway to relief in the area of police nonintervention, at least on the domestic front. In the late
1980s and early 1990s, after Deshaney dealt an initial blow to
due process challenges in the context of police nonintervention, 40 a number of academic commentators advocated for the
use of Equal Protection claims to address police inaction in domestic violence cases. 41 While recent cases have been less than
encouraging, this part of the Comment revisits this approach in
light of the alternatives foreclosed in Castle Rock. Specifically, it
synthesizes and builds upon existing arguments, addresses openings and obstacles in recent case law, and puts forth a renewed
call for such approaches. It also argues that intentional discrimiJessica Gonzales v. U.S.A., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 10,
2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/human-rights-womens-rights/essicagonzales-v-usa.
40 Deshaney, 489 U.S. 189.
41 See, e.g., Laura S. Harper, Battered Women Suing Police for Failure to
Intervene: Viable Legal Avenues After Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1393 (1990); Lauren L.
McFarlane, Symposium: The Right to Privacy One Hundred Years Later:
Notes: Domestic Violence Victims v. Municipalities: Who Pays When the Police will not Respond?, 41 CASE W. RES. 929 (1991); Amy Eppler, Battered
Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitution Help them
when the Police Won't?, 95 YALE L.J. 788 (1986); Daniel P. Whitmore, Enforcing the Equal Protection Clause on Behalf of Domestic Violence Victims:
the Impact of Doe v. Calumet City, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 123 (1995); Carolyne
R. Hathaway, Gender-Based Discriminationin Police Reluctance to Respond
to Domestic Assault Complaints, 75 GEO. L.J. 667 (1986).
39
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nation by police departments against domestic violence survivors as such-for which the burden of proof is significantly
lower-are likely to run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause,
even under rational basis review. Consequently, this genderneutral approach presents another avenue for post-Castle Rock
challenges to police nonintervention.
A.

Gender-Based Approach: Police Nonintervention as
Discrimination Against Women

While law enforcement protocols for responding to domestic
violence and other violent incidents are usually gender-neutral,
police are often more likely, in practice, to respond to violence
between non-intimates than to violence between intimates. This
well-documented 42 practice quite literally denies domestic violence survivors "equal protection of the laws" 43 and as such, is
the basis for § 1983 claims against police departments and municipalities incorporating the Equal Protection Clause of the
44
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the applicability
of the Equal Protection Clause to police inaction cases, and the
Circuits are split, albeit unevenly. The majority of federal courts
that have addressed police inaction in the domestic violence
See, e.g., Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 695 (10th Cir. 1988)
(reflecting that the arrest rate for non-intimate violence is nearly double that
for intimate violence in Kansas City).
42

43 U.S. CONST.

Amend. XIV.

Many disagree, from a normative and empirical perspective, with the premise that police should arrest batterers, particularly when the victim-usually
female-objects to the arrest. The appropriateness of pursuing an arrest (and
prosecution) against a victim's wishes is beyond the scope of this Comment,
and thus, the argument is confined to cases such as Castle Rock v. Gonzalez,
545 U.S. 748 (2005), in which a victim affirmatively requests police intervention. Moreover, it is the very act of punishing certain acts of violence, namely
non-intimate, while failing to punish others, namely intimate, that amounts to
a denial of Equal Protection.
44
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context have rejected gender-based Equal Protection claims,'45
with the notable exception of the Ninth Circuit and various federal district courts. 46 Nevertheless, it is well worth exploringand seeking to expand-the narrow openings for successful
Equal Protection claims, in light of the normative appeal of civil
rights approaches to domestic violence law, the flaws in existing
jurisprudence, the blow that Castle Rock dealt to battered
women and their families, and the impasse it left in its wake.
Few, if any, police departments have domestic violence arrest
or response policies that explicitly reference gender. Nevertheless, facially neutral classifications run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when they are
administered in a discriminatory fashion. 47 Indeed, in the seminal case of Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social

Services, in which the Supreme Court held, in a precursor to
Castle Rock, that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
See Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting Equal Protection claim); McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting Equal Protection claim); Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775
(8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting Equal Protection claim); Watson, 857 F.2d 690 (rejecting sex-based Equal Protection claim but finding genuine issue of fact
with regard to discrimination against domestic violence survivors); Hynson v.
City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1988) (rejecting Equal Protection
claim); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting sex-based
Equal Protection claim but finding genuine issue of fact with regard to discrimination against domestic violence survivors); Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d
1056 (1st Cir. 1997) (rejecting sex-based Equal protection claim for lack of
discriminatory intent); Semple v. City of Moundsville, 963 F. Supp. 1416
(N.D. W. Va. 1997) (rejecting Equal Protection claim).
46 See Macias v. Ihde, 219 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding broad Equal
Protection claim without distinguishing between discrimination against
women and discrimination against domestic violence survivors); Balistreri v.
Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding Equal Protection claim in light of smoking gun evidence); Williams v. City of Montgomery, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (upholding Equal Protection
claim); Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984)
(upholding Equal Protection claim on grounds of overbroad stereotypes);
Smith v. City of Elyria, 857 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (upholding Equal
Protection claim).
47 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
45
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Amendment did not provide an affirmative right to police protection, the Court emphasized the applicability of the Equal
Protection Clause to cases of police inaction.48 After ruling that
an individual could not hold the police liable for failing to prevent private acts of violence, the Court, in an oft-cited footnote,
offered a caveat: "The State may not, of course, selectively deny
its protective services to certain disfavored minorities without
49
violating the Equal Protection Clause."
In Eagleston v. Guido, the Second Circuit set forth the prevailing standard for adjudicating sex-based Equal Protection
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the differential treatment of intimate and non-intimate violence:
A directed verdict is appropriate in a domestic violence equal protection claim unless the plaintiff
adduces evidence sufficient to sustain the inference that there is a policy or a practice of affording less protection to victims of domestic violence
than to other victims of violence in comparable
circumstances, that discrimination against one sex
was a motivating factor, and that the policy or
practice was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injury.50
A single instance of police indifference is insufficient to establish the requisite "policy or practice" for a § 1983 claim alleging
deprivation of Constitutional rights. 51 However, a plaintiff may
prevail in such an action without reference to other members of
her protected class if she is able to demonstrate a history of police indifference to her own pleas for protection. 52 A plaintiff
Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189, 197
n.3 (1989).
48

49

Id.

50

Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 878 (2d Cir. 1994).
Id; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F Supp. 1521, 1530 (D. Conn. 1984)

51
52

("[i]n the instant case, however, the plaintiff Tracey Thurman has specifically
alleged in her statement of facts a series of acts and omissions on the part of
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who can point to differential training policies to demonstrate
differential treatment of intimate and non-intimate violence also
may prevail in an Equal Protection claim. 53 In contrast, a statistical pattern of a police department's differential treatment of
intimate and non-intimate violence may be insufficient, unless it
54
is extreme in magnitude.
Absent a showing of intentional discrimination, policies and
practices with a disparate impact on a disfavored minority generally will survive constitutional scrutiny under prevailing Equal
56
Protection jurisprudence. 55 This exacting and often unrealistic

standard has doomed the majority of Equal Protection claims in
57
this arena at the Circuit Court level.

the defendant police officers and police department that took place over the
course of eight months. From this particularized pleading a pattern emerges
that evidences deliberate indifference on the part of the police department to
the complaints of the plaintiff Tracey Thurman and to its duty to protect her.
Such an ongoing pattern of deliberate indifference raises an inference of 'custom' or policy on the part of the municipality"). See also, Macias v. Ihde, 219
F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding Equal Protection violation based solely on
plaintiff's treatment). But see, Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690,
696 (10th Cir. 1988) ("we doubt whether evidence of deliberate indifference
in the plaintiff's case alone would be sufficient evidence of different
treatment").
53 Watson, 857 F.2d at 696.
54 Id. at 695 (statistical evidence demonstrating a significantly higher arrest
rate for stranger violence than for intimate violence may not be sufficient to
establish requisite policy or custom). McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d
409, 415 (5th Cir. 1989) (statistical evidence demonstrating lower arrest rate
for domestic violence cases insufficient to establish policy of differential
treatment). But see McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294 n.12 (1987) (extreme statistical discrepancies may be sufficient to establish equal protection
violation).
55 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1976). But see Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (extreme
disparate impact may be sufficient to establish equal protection violation in
the absence of discriminatory intent).
56 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).
57 See Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1994); Ricketts v. City of
Columbia, 36 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 1994); Watson, 857 F.2d 690. But see Balis-
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Nevertheless, the hurdle of discriminatory intent, while formidable, is not insurmountable. Even in the absence of smoking
gun statements (of the politically incorrect variety that savvy
state actors have by and large learned to avoid), police departments' differential treatment of intimate and non-intimate violence evinces an intent to discriminate against women and
thereby invokes intermediate scrutiny.
For one, disparate impact is probative of discriminatory intent, particularly when the disparate impact is extreme in magnitude.58 Because women make up 90-95 percent of domestic
violence victims, 59 the disparate impact of differential police responses to intimate and non-intimate violence is enormous in
magnitude.
Historical background also can shed light on discriminatory
motives. 60 Viewed in historical context, police non-intervention
in domestic violence cases emerges as part of an extended history of shielding "private" acts of violence from public regulation.61

This

history

reflects

a

conceptual

framework

of

discrimination and as such, is probative of the intent behind contemporary practices.
In the past, parents, masters, husbands, and others "having
authority in foro domestico" were authorized to "give reasonable correction to those under their care." 62 Furthermore, they
were not liable when such "correction" resulted in death, unless
the use of force was excessive. 63 The law of chastisement was
treri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding evidence of animus towards women in police officer's blatantly misogynistic
comments).
58 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
59 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 2.
60 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267 ("[t]he historical background of the
decision is one evidentiary source [of discriminatory intent], particularly if it
reveals a series of official actions undertaken for invidious purposes").
61 Eppler, supra note 41, at 792-93.
62

2

JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW

§§ 604,

619.
63

Id.
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deeply intertwined with the common law concept of coverture,
under which a wife's legal identity merged with that of her husband, rendering a husband liable for certain crimes committed
by his wife. 64 Because husbands had to answer for their wives'
wrongdoing, the argument went, they were entitled to restrain
their wives via chastisement. 65 Since the mid-eighteenth century,
the chastisement of wives by their husbands has been prohibited
by law.66 Nevertheless, in about 1892, while chastisement was
still illegal, husbands could "exercise over the wife a physical
restraint not precisely defined." 67
The institution of marriage also shielded men from other
types of prosecution. For example, a man was excused for the
rape of a virgin if he promptly married her,68 and while he ordinarily would be liable for passing on a sexually transmitted disease to an unwitting female, he could escape prosecution if the
unwitting female happened to be his wife. 69 Thus, the law constructed marriage as an institution in which ordinary norms of
conduct did not apply and which consequently afforded free
reign to men in disciplining their wives. This construction necessarily rested on invidious stereotypes as to the inferiority and
subordination of women.
While the notion of coverture has dissipated, the widespread
acceptance of domestic violence-and its corollary, a rhetorical
distinction between intimate and non-intimate violence-persists today. This acceptance manifests itself in both de jure and
de facto forms, from rape statutes that render marital rape a
64

See Id.

See generally Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love, Wife Beating as Prerogative, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).
65

66

1

JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW

(2d ed. 1858-59).
67

1

JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW

(8th ed. 1892).
68 Id. at § 947 n. 6 (citing 1 Hawk. P.C. Cuw. Ed. 123 § 11).
69 1 EMLIN MCCLAIN, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW AS Now
ISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES
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lesser crime than other forms of rape 70 to the respective reluctance of police and prosecutors to make arrests and file charges
when violence occurs between intimate partners.
Thus, an ostensibly gender-neutral distinction between intimate and non-intimate violence is anything but gender-neutral.
In turning a blind eye towards domestic violence and affording
relative impunity to batterers, police departments engage in and
perpetuate a longstanding practice of shielding these "private"
behaviors from public regulation-a practice grounded in antiquated stereotypes as to women's roles in intimate relationships
and society. Courts have long recognized that the use of stereotypes constitutes intentional discrimination. 71 Thus, the social
and historical underpinnings of this ostensibly benign classification shed light on its very nature and give rise to an inference of
72
intentional discrimination on the part of police departments.
Equal Protection claims in the police protection arena often
have failed because Circuit Court judges have been unwilling to
make the requisite leap from (well documented) discrimination
against domestic violence survivors to (harder to prove) intentional discrimination against women. 73 Disparate treatment of
intimate and non-intimate violence clearly has a disparate im-

Four states still have a marital rape exception of some kind. See Ky. REV.
§ 510.035 (LexisNexis 2008) (marriage a complete defense to
statutory rape); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43 (2007) (rape occurs when "fe-

70

STAT. ANN.

male victim" submits because she is under the false impression that the of-

fender is her husband); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2002)
(nonconsensual intercourse between married individuals only qualifies as
rape when force is used or threatened); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (2003)
(nonconsensual intercourse between married individuals only qualifies as

rape under limited circumstances).
71 See, e.g., Mississippi v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Smith v. Elyria, 857 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ohio
1994) (police department's practice of nonintervention rested on gender stereotypes and therefore constituted intentional discrimination).
72 For a similar argument, see Eppler, supra note 41.
73 Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 1994).
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52

pact on women, but courts have rejected sex-based Equal Pro74
tection claims in this context.
In rejecting such claims, courts have relied heavily on the legal standard the high Court handed down in PersonnelAdministrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney.7 5 Feeney concerned an Equal
76
Protection challenge to a state hiring preference for veterans.
Because the vast majority of veterans were men, the policy
heavily favored men regardless of its ostensible gender-neutrality.77 In oft-cited terms that have become the touchstone for discriminatory intent in the context of gender, the Court upheld
the challenged policy: "'Discriminatory purpose,' however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. . .it implies that the decision maker. . .selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because
of,' not merely 'in spite of' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." 78
Similarly, in Washington v. Davis, the seminal case on disparate impact, the Supreme Court upheld a qualifying exam with a
disparate impact on minorities, holding that disparate impact
79
alone did not constitute a constitutional violation.
Contrary to the view espoused by the majority of jurisdictions, this standard does not foreclose properly conceived sexbased Equal Protection claims. Police nonintervention is a far
cry from privileging stranger violence over domestic violence in
spite of the foreseeable impact on women. Instead, as this ComSee Id.
Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1067 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Pers. Adm'r of
Mass.v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) as the governing legal standard and thus
finding that the view adopted by the majority of circuits was more consistent
with Supreme Court precedent than the minority view advanced in Balistreri
v. Pacifica, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1988) and Thurman v. City of Torrington,
595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984)).
76 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 259.
77 Id. at 260.
78 Id. at 256.
79 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
74
75
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ment has outlined, police departments subordinate domestic violence to stranger violence because of a deeply rooted-and
highly misogynistic-social understanding of gender relations
that militates against state intervention in "private" matters.
Otherwise stated, it is no coincidence, nor even a vestige of
historical discrimination, that females make up the vast majority
of domestic violence survivors, just as women make up the vast
majority of non-veterans and whites made up the majority of
high-scorers on written achievement tests. 80 By its very nature,
domestic violence is sex-based. 81 Nor is it a coincidence that the
subordination of "private" acts of violence has a disproportionate impact on women, just as veterans' preferences privilege
men. The theoretical distinction between the private and the
public is itself a highly gendered concept. 82 Thus, police nonintervention claims are distinguishable from other Equal Protec83
tion claims that have failed for want of discriminatory intent.
However, the Court's decision in McClesky v. Kemp gives
reason for pause. In McClesky, plaintiffs challenged a jury verdict that subjected a black man to the death penalty for the murder of a white police officer. 84 In support of their Equal
Protection claim, plaintiffs cited a study indicating a strong correlation between the race of the victim and defendant and the
imposition of the death penalty. 85 The McClesky Court rejected
plaintiffs' claim, holding that robust evidence of discrimination
on the societal level did not evince discriminatory intent on the
individual level, 86 and noting that "because discretion is essenSee Id.; Pers. Adm'r of Mass.v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). This distinction is not intended to condone the results of Feeney and Davis, given the
discriminatory legacies that laid the groundwork for both cases.
81 See, e.g., YLLO & STRAUS, supra note 6.
82 See generally Sally Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence
of Privacy, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2000).
83 See, e.g., Feeney, 442 U.S. 256.
84 McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 283-85 (1987).
80

85

Id. at 286.

Id. at 308 (statistical evidence indicating robust correlation between race
and imposition of death penalty cannot "prove that race enters into any capi86
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tial to the criminal justice process, [the Supreme Court demands] exceptionally clear proof before [it] would infer that the
discretion has been abused."87 One might levy a similar attack
against an Equal Protection claim directed at an individual police officer for failure to arrest a batterer, and indeed, courts
have taken this tact in rejecting civil rights challenges to police
nonintervention.88
However, affording police officers in nonintervention cases
the degree of deference afforded to jurors in McClesky is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's treatment of police discretion
in the nonintervention context. In Deshaney, discussed supra,
the Court emphasized the discretion police officers enjoyed in
making arrests but nevertheless noted that, "the State may not,
of course, selectively deny its protective services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection
Clause." 89 That prohibition is meaningless when police exercises
of discretion enjoy a presumption of constitutionality.
Other Equal Protection cases present a more favorable outlook. For example, the Supreme Court's 1996 opinion in United
States v. Virginia suggests a willingness to strike down policies
and practices that stem from overbroad stereotypes. 90 To some
extent, the claims at issue in United States v. Virginia are distintal sentencing decisions or that race was a factor in McClesky's particular
case").
87 Id. at 297.
88 See, e.g., Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 782 (8th Cir. 1994)
("Police 'discretion is essential to the criminal justice process"' and "'[w]here
the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal process is involved, we decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious."' (quoting McClesky,
481 U.S. at 297, 313)); Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 878 (2nd Cir. 1994)
("'Because of the inherent differences between domestic disputes and
nondomestic disputes, legitimately different factors may affect a police officer's decision to arrest or not to arrest in any given situation."' (quoting
Ricketts, 36 F.3d at 781)).
89 Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189, 197
n.3 (1989).
90 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). But see Nyugen v.
INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (suggesting an unwillingness on the part of the Court
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guishable from the Equal Protection claims a battered woman
or her survivors might bring against an unresponsive police department, because the challenged policy in that case was an explicit gender-based classification, namely the exclusion of
women from the Virginia Military Institute. However, as this
Comment has illustrated, systematic policies of nonintervention
in "private" violence amount to a tacit approval of the subordination of women, and as such, are tantamount to disparate
treatment of men and women.
The legislative history of the now-defunct Civil Rights Remedy under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) lends support to the validity of Equal Protection claims challenging police
nonintervention. The Civil Rights Remedy created a private
right of action against "a person... who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender."91 Congress enacted this provision
pursuant to its Commerce Clause and Section 5 powers. 92 As
Section 5 legislation, VAWA was premised on the Congressional
finding that states' differential treatment of intimate and nonintimate violence (spanning a wide range of policies and practices, including police non-intervention) 93 was a form of intentional gender discrimination proscribed by the Equal Protection

to query into the deeply rooted stereotypes and gendered norms underlying
ostensibly gender-neutral policies).
91 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2006).
92 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a).
93 See Johanna R. Shargel, In Defense of the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 106 YALE L.J. 1849, 1873-74 (1997) ("Congressional hearings on the VAWA Remedy showed that gender bias contaminates
every level of the state system, and that insensitive and unresponsive treatment by police, prosecutors, and judges often results in low reporting and
conviction rates. Police, responsible for the initial screening of cases, are notorious for not responding to situations involving violence against women,
particularly domestic violence. The Fund for the Feminist Majority reported
at the VAWA legislative hearings that '23% of women who decline from reporting their being raped to the police do so because they thought the police
would be inefficient, ineffective, or insensitive."').
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Clause. 94 Specifically, Congress found that gender motivated
crimes violated "the victim's right to equal protection of the
laws" and freedom from "discrimination on the basis of gender." 95 Congress also found that,
"State and federal laws do not adequately protect
against the bias element of crimes of violence motivated by gender, which separates those crimes
from acts of random violence, nor do these adequately provide victims of gender-motivated
crimes the opportunity to vindicate their interests;
existing bias and discrimination in the criminal justice system often deprives victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender of equal protection of
the laws and the redress to which they are entitled... a Federal civil rights action as specified in
this section is necessary to guarantee equal protection of the laws... and the victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender have a right to equal
protection of the laws, including a system of justice that is unaffected by bias or discrimination
and that, at every relevant stage, treats such
crimes as seriously as other violent crimes." 96
This finding was supported by testimony indicating discrepancies between laws on the books addressing gender-based violence and actual prosecution for gender-based crimes. 97 The
Civil Rights Remedy sought to redress these Equal Protection
violations at the state level by providing a federal forum in
which injured parties could seek the relief their home states de-

Victoria Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 7
n.128 (1996).
94

95

Id. at 7.

96 H.R.
97

REP.

No. 103-711, at 385-86 (1994).

Nourse, supra note 94, at 4.
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nied. 98 However, because this remedy directly targeted private
actors, namely batterers, rapists, and the like, while the Fourteenth Amendment covers only state actors, the Supreme Court
held in United States v. Morrison that the Civil Rights Remedy
failed the congruence and proportionality requirements for Section 5 legislation. 99 Holding the Civil Rights Remedy to be an
invalid exercise of Congress' Section 5 Power-as well as Commerce Power-the Court struck down the Civil Rights Remedy
in 2000.100

However, in so doing, the Court did not deny that state responses to domestic violence, including policies and practices of
police nonintervention, ran afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause; it simply maintained that a remedy against private actors was incongruent with alleged Constitutional violations on
the part of state actors.10 ' Thus, the underlying premise of the
Civil Rights Remedy, buttressed by years of advocacy, Committee Reports and Congressional findings, remains a compelling
and viable claim-albeit less authoritative than a judicial pronouncement. 10 2 Moreover, because the Civil Rights Remedy was
enacted after a number of Circuits had soundly rejected Equal
Protection challenges to police nonintervention,103 its enactment
suggests the continued political viability of Equal Protection
theories in this arena, despite significant setbacks in the courtroom. Despite Morrison-and in light of Castle Rock-the atGoldscheid, supra note 21 at 117-18 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-711,
at 385-86 (1994)).
99 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-26 (2007). For a critique of
98

the Court's Section 5 analysis, see Goldscheid, supra note 21; Robert C. Post
& Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law, FederalAntidiscriminationLegislation after Morrison and Kimnmel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000).
100 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 629.
101 Id. at 625-26.
102 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (finding that Congress
cannot change the scope of constitutional rights in enacting Section 5
legislation).
103 See, e.g., Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988);
Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026 (3rd Cir. 1988).
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tempt by VAWA's proponents to bring the power of civil rights
legislation to bear on domestic violence is well worth reviving.104
B.

Gender-NeutralApproach: Police Nonintervention as
Discrimination Against Domestic Violence Survivors

Given the inherent challenges of establishing intent to discriminate against women, it is critical to explore gender-neutral
challenges to discrimination against domestic violence survivors
as such, an approach that has proved successful in more than
one instance in which a sex-based discrimination approach has
failed. 105 While sex-based discrimination provides a more accurate conceptual framework for police nonintervention in light of
the deep-rooted stereotypes and norms underlying these practices, the stakes are too high to leave a stone unturned in pursuing legal recourse for domestic violence victims and their
surviving kin.
Because domestic violence survivors do not constitute a suspect class, claims of discrimination against this population are
subject to rational basis review, a less rigorous standard than
intermediate scrutiny. 106 However, the relative ease of establishing the requisite intent-and in some cases, the absence of an
intent requirement-under this approach may outweigh the disadvantages of the lower standard. Furthermore, discrimination
against domestic violence survivors runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause even under this deferential standard of review.
104 The recent election of Sen. Joseph Biden to the post of Vice President
may present a unique opportunity for doing so, given his leading role in enacting VAWA and his continued support for women's rights. See Susan Milli-

gan, Activists Expect Clinton to Propel Women's Rights, BOSTON GLOBE,
December 1, 2008, at Al (Kim Gandy, President of the National Organiza-

tion for Women, heralds Biden's appointment as a boon to women's rights
efforts).
105

See Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 1995); Watson, 857 F.2d at

695.
106

New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 (1979).
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To the extent that police department policies and practices explicitly classify domestic violence survivors as distinct from survivors of comparable but non-intimate violence, intent is not
required, as any classification will be found unconstitutional in
the absence of a rational basis.10 However, even in the absence
of explicit classifications, inferring an intent to discriminate
against domestic violence survivors does not require the conceptual and historically grounded leap necessary for sex-based
claims.
Empirical evidence as to the efficacy of arrests belies the notion that distinctions between intimate and non-intimate violence are grounded in a rational basis.10 8 The seminal
Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment compared the efficacy of three interventions: arresting a perpetrator, providing
advice and mediation, and ordering a perpetrator to leave for
eight hours.10 9 The study found that perpetrators who were not
arrested were twice as likely as those who were arrested to assault their partners again. 110 Furthermore, in light of widely used
''no-drop" prosecution policies (which mandate prosecution for
domestic violence crimes regardless of victims' wishes), police
departments are hard pressed to claim that arrests are less effective for intimate violence due to the tendency of domestic violence survivors to recant and drop charges.1 "

Id.
108 See, e.g., Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 878 (2nd Cir. 1994) ("A community may decide that mediation makes more sense, or is more promising,
in disputes between members of the same family, or between neighbors, than
in disputes between strangers, or that Family Court or counseling is a useful
alternative to the criminal courts in certain situations. These considerations
may impact arrest statistics without violating the equal protection clause").
109 Eppler, supra note 41, at 791 n.16 (citing Domestic Violence: Study Fa107

vors Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1983, at Cl).
11o Id.
111

See generally

NANCY

K.D.

LEMON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW

714-91

(2d. ed 2001) (providing an overview of No Drop policies).
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EMPLOYMENT

Job loss, and other adverse employment actions, can be particularly devastating collateral consequences of domestic violence. Studies indicate staggering rates of job loss for domestic
violence survivors, on the order of 24 to 52%.112 At the same
time, stable employment is critical to the safety and well-being
of these individuals. Without an independent source of income
to support themselves and their children, many survivors have
little choice but to remain with their batterers.113
Moreover, the impact of domestic violence on employment
extends far beyond individual employees and places women at a
serious disadvantage in the workplace. In the aggregate, domestic violence survivors lose nearly eight million days of work per
year.114 In addition, 55 to 65% of welfare (Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families) recipients report that they have experienced
physical abuse by an intimate partner at some point in their
lifetime.115
Despite the passage of Title VII, rampant discrimination
against women in the workplace persists, particularly in the subtle, but nonetheless invidious form of collateral consequences
for domestic violence survivors in the workplace. Because Title
VII includes no explicit protections for domestic violence survivors, and because the civil rights of domestic violence survivors
often go unprotected despite applicable federal prohibitions on
sex-discrimination, it is worth exploring ways in which to leverage, and push the boundaries of, Title VII's prohibition on sex112
AND

U.S.

GEN.

ACCOUNTING

IMPLICATIONS

FOR

OFFICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PREVALENCE

EMPLOYMENT

AMONG

WELFARE

RECIPIENTS

8

(1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99012.pdf.
113 WENDY R. WEISER & DEBORAH A. WIDISS, EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION
FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS 4 (2004), available at http://www.legal
momentum.org/assets/pdfs/employmentclearinghouse2004.pdf.
114 Domestic Violence in the Workplace Statistics, AMERICAN INSTITUTE ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.aidv-usa.com (last visited April 5, 2011).
115 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 112, at 3-4.
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based discrimination in order to combat the myriad hardships
that domestic violence survivors experience in the workplace.
A.

Sex-Based Harassment Under Title VII
(HostileWork Environment)

When an employee experiences domestic violence in the
workplace, an employer that fails to meet its remedial obligation
may be liable under Title VII for sex-based harassment. Sexbased harassment has been defined as hostile or intimidating behavior that is unwelcome and "sufficiently severe or pervasive
'to alter the conditions of the [victim's] employment and create
an abusive working environment." 116
1. "Sex-based" Prong
Sex-based harassment must arise from gender but need not be
sexual in nature to be actionable under Title VI.117 As detailed
above, heterosexual domestic violence as a societal phenomenon falls squarely within the rubric of sex-based conduct defined
as such, as it stems from deeply rooted patriarchal norms.

116

Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting

Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
Policy Guidelines on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, EQUAL EMCOMMISSION,
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
PLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY
117

currentissues.html (last visited April 5, 2011) ("harassment not involving sexmay also give rise to Title VII liability (just as in
ual activity or language
the case of harassment based on race, national origin or religion) if it is 'sufficiently patterned or pervasive' and directed at employees because of their
sex") (citing Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987);
McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). See also EEOC v.

Farmer Brothers, 31 F.3d 891, 898 (9th Cir. 1994) ("sexual" element of sexual
harassment may be secondary to a general desire to subordinate women).
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Requisite Degree of Hostility

Instances of domestic violence in the workplace qualify as
sex-based harassment when "such hostile conduct pollutes the
victim's workplace, making it more difficult for her to do her
job, to take pride in her work, and to desire to stay on in her
position."118 Such conduct need not inflict documented psycho-

logical damage to rise to the level of sex-based harassment.11 9
Courts have used a sliding scale test for sex-based harassment,
such that the degree of requisite severity varies inversely with
that of frequency. Thus, a single instance of harassing conduct, if
sufficiently severe, can be sufficient to establish a hostile work
environment. 120 For example, a single instance of physical assault, or a pattern of phone calls or stalking may constitute sexbased harassment.
Courts will look to "social context" to determine whether a
particular behavior is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a
hostile work environment from the standpoint of a reasonable
person in the plaintiff's shoes. 12 1 In cases of hostile work environment involving domestic violence cases, it is critical that
courts undertake the "social context" analysis carefully so as to
118 Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994).
119 Harris v. Forklift Syst., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
120 Cf Tomka v. Seller Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir. 1995) ("even a
single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim's employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII liability"); Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1423 (9th
Cir. 1995) (rape and sexual assault were sufficient to establish a Title VII
claim).
121 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81-2 (1998) ("A professional football player's working environment is not severely or pervasively
abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads
onto the field-even if the same behavior would reasonably be experienced as
abusive by the coach's secretary (male or female) back at the office. The real
social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully
captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts
performed").
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avoid hasty conclusions and false assumptions based on what
may appear to be submissive or acquiescent behavior on the
part of survivors.
3.

Sex-Based Harassment by a Supervisor

In some cases, an employer may be liable when an employee's
supervisor abuses her. When the harassing conduct culminates
in a "tangible employment action," the employer is strictly liable
for the supervisor's conduct.12 2 "Tangible employment action"
includes "discharge, demotion. . .undesirable reassignment...
[and] constructive discharge."' 123 However, when the harassing
conduct does not result in a tangible employment action, an em124
ployer may avoid liability by asserting an affirmative defense.
Specifically, the employer must demonstrate that it "took reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior"12 5 and that the employee "unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
26
otherwise."1
4.

Sex-Based Harassment by Fellow Employees

Employers may be liable for acts of domestic violence perpetrated by one employee against another. For example, in Fuller
v. City of Oakland, the Ninth Circuit found that domestic violence and stalking occurring between two city employees constituted sex-based harassment under Title VII.127 Appellant, a
former police officer, filed suit against the City of Oakland when
122

Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 143 (2004).

Id. at 137.
See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
125 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
126 Id.
127 Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1995).
123
124
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a former co-worker, with whom she had previously been in a
romantic relationship, engaged in a series of abusive tactics that
led appellant to develop a severe stress disorder and ultimately
resign.128 Once on notice as to the harassment, the City failed to
prevent its continuation.129 The Ninth Circuit found that the
stalking and abuse-which included harassing and threatening
phone calls, aggressive behavior, and unwarranted scrutiny of
appellant's work-constituted a hostile work environment and
that the city had failed to meet its remedial obligations.130
5. Sex-Based Harassment by Non-Employees
Domestic violence is not confined to intimate settings, and indeed, often follows domestic violence survivors to their places of
employment, even when they do not work with their batterers.
For example, a batterer may lurk the hallways of a survivor's
office or frequent the cafe where she works as a waitress. In
such cases, employers may be liable for acts of domestic violence committed by a non-employee on workplace premises.
According to persuasive EEOC guidance, an employer may be
liable for sexual harassment of an employee by a non-employee
"where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees)
knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take
immediate and appropriate corrective action." In "reviewing
these cases the Commission will consider the extent of the employer's control and any other legal responsibility which the employer may have with respect to the conduct of non131
employees."
These regulations are consistent with established tort principles governing employer liability, in that an employer exercises
"at least some degree of control over anyone on its premises."' 132
128
129
130

131
132

Id. at 1525-26.
Id. at 1526.
Id. at 1525-29.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2009).
Jarman v. City of Dundee, 682 F. Supp. 1375, 1378 n.5 (N.D. Ill.
1997).
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Moreover, numerous federal courts have relied on this guideline
1 33
to impose liability for sexual harassment by non-employees.
In response to an allegation of sex-based harassment by a
non-employee, an employer may assert that circumstances
outside of the workplace exposed the employee to harassment.134 In some cases, an employee will successfully counter
such a defense if she can establish that the nature of her job
placed her in contact with her abuser, stalker, or attacker, particularly if her job is one that frequently exposes her to the
public.135
6.

Remedial Obligations of Employers

An employer is liable for an employee's harassment of a fellow employee when the employer knows or has reason to know
about the harassing conduct and nevertheless takes inadequate-or simply unsuccessful-measures to remedy the situation.136 When "an employer receives a complaint or otherwise
learns of an alleged sexual harassment in the workplace, the employer should investigate promptly and thoroughly" and "[t]he
employer should take immediate and appropriate corrective action by doing whatever is necessary to end the harassment,
make the victim whole by restoring lost employment benefits or
133 See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982)

("the environment in which an employee works can be rendered offensive in
an equal degree by the acts of supervisors, coworkers, or even strangers to
the workplace") (citations omitted); Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc.,
265 F.3d 903, 912 (9th Cir. 2001) (employer acquiesced in hostile work environment when employee reported that she had been raped by client during
business dinner); Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1074 (10th Cir.
1998) (standard for employer liability for sexual harassment by customers is
the same as that for sexual harassment by co-workers).
134 Maria Amelia Calaf, Breaking the Cycle: Title VII, Domestic Violence,
and Workplace Discrimination,21 LAW & INEQ. 167, 179 (2003).
135 Id.
136 Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001).
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opportunities, and prevent the misconduct from occurring." 137
Thus, when an employer knows or has reason to know that an
employee has been subjected to domestic violence on workplace
premises, and the harassing conduct persists, the employer may
be liable for sex-based harassment under Title VII. For example,
if a domestic violence survivor provides her employer with a
photo of her abuser, the employer has an affirmative duty to
prevent him from entering the building; if she asks to change
shifts so as to avoid encounters with her abuser, the employer
must honor her request.
Title VII's prohibition of sex-based discrimination extends to
both male and female domestic violence survivors. 138 In addition, sex-based harassment proscribed by Title VII includes
same-sex harassment. 139 Thus, a male or female survivor of domestic violence perpetrated by a member of the same sex may
have a valid Title VII claim for sex-based discrimination, provided the requisite conditions for hostile work environment are
met. To determine whether particular behavior directed at an
individual of the same sex constitutes sex-based discrimination,
a court will undertake a totality of circumstances test, "examin[ing] the social context in which particular behavior occurs
1 40
and is experienced by its target."
As detailed above, domestic violence correlates strongly with
sex, and is motivated predominantly by sex. Thus, domestic violence survivors who suffer disparate treatment or disparate impact in the workplace by virtue of their domestic violence status
may invoke Title VII's prohibitions against sex-based
discrimination.

137 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

supra note 117.

138

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998).

139
140

Id. at 82.
Id. at 81.
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B. Disparate Treatment
An aggrieved employee seeking relief for disparate treatment
under Title VII must establish that she is a member of a protected class (i.e., a woman), that she is qualified for the job at
issue, that she suffered an adverse employment action (e.g., failure to hire, termination, demotion, disciplinary action, etc.), and
that the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination. 141 If the employee meets her initial burden, the burden
shifts to the employer to establish a non-discriminatory reason
for the adverse action.142 Finally, the burden shifts back to the
aggrieved employee to establish that the employer's stated justification for the adverse action is pretextual and that the adverse
143
action was motivated by discriminatory intent.
A female survivor of domestic violence may establish disparate treatment through the use of a comparator, or a similarly
situated male who receives more favorable treatment than
she. 144 In this context, two individuals are similarly situated
when they "are involved in or accused of the same offense and
are disciplined in different ways."' 145 The individuals need not
146
share a position, nor must job performance be equivalent.
For example, in Rohde v. K.O. Steel Castings, Inc., a male employee assaulted plaintiff, a female employee, on workplace
premises. The assault was an act of domestic violence, as the
employees were intimately involved. When their employer was
apprised of the incident, it promptly suspended and subsequently discharged plaintiff but took no adverse action against
her male batterer. The Fifth Circuit held that the aggrieved employee had established a prima facie case of disparate treatment:
"Where two employees were engaged in an altercation and the
See Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2nd Cir. 2000).
142 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
143 Id.
144 Rodhe v. K.O. Steel Casings, Inc., 649 F.2d 317, 322 (5th Cir. 1981).
145 Id.
146 Id.
141
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aggressor went unpunished while the victim, a member of a minority protected by the [Civil Rights] Act [of 1964], bore the full
brunt of retribution, it is clear to us that Congress intended a
cause of action to lie in the absence of a sufficient explanation of
non-discriminatory reasons for the disparity."147
A female domestic violence survivor can establish disparate
treatment without claiming that all members of her protected
class, namely all female employees, are treated unfavorably;148
she may be the only domestic violence survivor in her workplace. Nor must she prove that similarly situated individuals
outside of her protected class, namely similarly situated males,
1 49
received more favorable treatment.
In particular, a female survivor can prevail in a disparate
treatment claim without identifying a comparator when she can
demonstrate that her employer's adverse actions arose from stereotypes about women. 150 For example, a dismissal may be accompanied by a snide comment about deserved abuse.
Id. at 323. See also Excel Corp. v. Bosley, 165 F.3d 635, 638, 641 (8th Cir.
1999) (disparate treatment in violation of Title VII where female survivor
was discharged after her husband, an employee who suffered no adverse action, abused her at work).
148 See Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107,
118-19 (2d Cir. 2004).
149 Id. at 121 ("In determining whether an employee has been discriminated
against 'because of such individual's... sex,' the courts have consistently emphasized that the ultimate issue is the reasons for the individual plaintiff's
treatment, not the relative treatment of different groups within the
workplace.").
150 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) ("'[In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women resulting from sex stereotypes,"' (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of
Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n. 13 (1978))). See also Balistreri v. Pacifica, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding defendant's animus toward battered women sufficient to state a claim of intentional sex-based
discrimination); Smith v. City of Elyria, 857 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ohio 1994)
(finding that the police department's differential response to domestic violence and other complaints reflected stereotypes of women and thus created
a genuine issue of fact as to intentional sex-based discrimination).
147
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More broadly, if a female employee suffers an adverse employment action that arises from her status as a survivor of domestic violence, she may have a valid cause of action for sexbased discrimination, even in the absence of overt evidence of
stereotyping.' 5' This cause of action has strong underpinnings in
the intimate, and indeed causal, relationship between gender
and domestic violence; insofar as domestic violence is a function
of sex, discrimination against domestic violence victims constitutes discrimination against women.
C.

Disparate Impact

Employment policies and practices that burden victims of domestic violence have a disparate impact on women, and as such,
are proscribed under Title VII, regardless of discriminatory intent. 152 Because women make up 90 to 95% of domestic violence victims, 153 policies and practices that place survivors of
domestic violence at a special disadvantage in the workplace
have a disparate impact on women and thus run afoul of Title
VII.154
151 Such an approach has prevailed in analogous Equal Protection cases. See,
e.g., Williams v. City of Montgomery, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1365 (M.D. Ala.
1998).
152 See EEOC v. Dial Corp., 469 F.3d 735, 742 (8th Cir. 2006).
153 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 2.
154 This line of reasoning has prevailed in Fair Housing Act challenges to
housing policies that place domestic violence survivors at a disadvantage.
Disparate impact analysis under Title VII is consistent with that under the
Fair Housing Act, and as such, illustrates the useful cross-pollination that
arises from a broad-based civil rights approach to domestic violence law. See,
e.g., Winsor v. Regency Property Mgm't, No. 94CV2349 (7th Cir. 1995) (landlord's facially neutral policy of categorically excluding domestic violence survivors established prima facie case of disparate impact on the basis of sex);
Alvera v. C.B.M. Group, Case No. 01-857 (D. Or. 2001), available at http://
www.aclu.org/files/images/asset-upload-file457_33995.pdf (landlord's zerotolerance policy for violence in rental units had disparate impact on women,
in violation of Fair Housing Act). But see Robinson v. Cincinnati Housing
Auth., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39523, *12 (2008) (rejecting disparate impact
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Title VII's prohibitions on disparate impact may be particularly useful to survivors who experience abuse outside of the
workplace, who suffer at the hands of their employers but cannot prove overt discrimination or discriminatory intent, and who
do not work with their abusers. 155 For example, prohibitions on
flex-time arrangements have a disparate impact insofar as they
penalize battered women who need flexibility to address, escape, and recover from abuse at home.
To make out a prima facie case of disparate impact employment discrimination, an aggrieved employee must identify a
facially neutral policy or practice, establish that it has a disparate impact on her protected class, and show causation. 156 To

rebut a disparate impact claim, an employer must demonstrate
that the practice at issue is "related to safe and efficient job performance and is consistent with BUSINESS NECESSITY."' 157 If the
employer meets this burden, an aggrieved employee can prevail
nevertheless if she can demonstrate that an alternative policy or
practice would serve the same ends through less discriminatory
means. 158

IV.

HOUSING

Domestic violence has a disproportionate impact on low-income women, 159 and as such, it often complicates already tenuous housing situations. Indeed, domestic violence plays a major
role in homelessness among women: 22 to 50% of homeless
challenge to public housing policy that allowed hate crime survivors, but not

domestic violence survivors, to transfer units for safety reasons).
155
156

Calaf, supra note 134, at 186.

See Lewis v. Aerospace Community Credit Union, 114 F.3d 745, 750 (8th

Cir. 1997).
157 EEOC v. Dial Corp., 469 F.3d 735, 742 (8th Cir. 2006).
158 Id.
159 PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES,

U.S.

DEPARTMENTT OF JUS-

1TICE, EXTENT, NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN STUDY

33 (2000).
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women cite domestic violence as the direct cause of their homelessness. 160 In the 2005 Hunger and Homeless Survey conducted
by the United States Conference of Mayors, half of U.S. cities
identified domestic violence as a primary cause of homelessness.1 61 The threat of homelessness often prevents survivors
from taking steps to extricate themselves from abusive relationships, 162 and homelessness, like other forms of economic instability, often forces domestic violence survivors to return to their
163
abusers.
While discrimination is not the only cause of homelessness
and housing instability among domestic violence survivors, it
plays a significant role in these phenomena. Many landlords
hasten to evict tenants who are experiencing domestic violence,
and others categorically refuse to rent to those with a known
history of domestic violence.1 64 For example, a 2005 study conducted by the Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York
indicated that 28% of New York City housing providers either
categorically refused to rent to domestic violence victims or
failed to follow up with testers claiming to represent domestic
violence survivors seeking housing.165 In addition, many public
housing authorities evict domestic violence survivors pursuant
to "zero-tolerance" policies-policies dating back to the Clinton
160 EMILY J. MARTIN & DEBORAH

A. WIDISS,

USING FEDERAL AND STATE

LAWS TO PROMOTE SECURE HOUSING FOR SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 2 (2007); ACLU, WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

(2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/wom
ensrights/factsheethomelessness_2008.pdf.
161 Private Housing Company Won't Evict Domestic Violence Victims after
ACLU Lawsuit, ACLU (Feb. 26, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/
womensrights/violence/34213prs20080226.html.
AND HOMELESSNESS

162 Id.
163 See LEMON, supra note 111, at
164 EMILY J. MARTIN & DEBORAH
165 See Private Housing Company,
CENTER,

No

1079-1100.
A. WIDISS, supra note 160, at 2.
supra note 161. See also EQUAL RIGHTS

VACANCY: HOUSING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SURVIVORS OF

(2008), available at
http://www.equalrightscenter.org/site/DocServer/DV-ReportFINALCOP
Y.pdf?doclD=152.
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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era under which entire households are evicted if a single member of the household commits a drug offense or violent crime.166
Indeed, Congress has acknowledged that "[w]omen and families
across the country are being discriminated against, denied access
to, and even evicted from public and subsidized housing because
7
of their status as victims of domestic violence."16
This discrimination further oppresses domestic violence survivors. Moreover, domestic violence survivors who fear that they
will be penalized for their domestic violence status have an incentive to hide the abuse they are experiencing, and consequently, may hesitate to seek help from a landlord (e.g.,
changing the locks, transferring units, enlisting the assistance of
security personnel) and from civil society (e.g., obtaining a restraining order, seeking on-site police intervention, etc).168
While the Violence Against Women Act of 2005 (VAWA)169
explicitly protects domestic violence survivors from being
170
evicted or denied housing due to domestic violence status, it
applies only to tenants in certain types of federally subsidized
housing-public housing, 71 private housing paid for with a Section 8 voucher, 172 Section 8 project-based housing, 173 and certain
Tara M. Vrettos, Victimizing the Victim: Evicting Domestic Violence Victims from Public Housing Based on the Zero-Tolerance Policy, 9 CARDOZO
166

WOMEN'S L.J.
167 42 U.S.C.

97, 102-04 (2002).

§ 14043e(3) (2006) (Congressional findings on domestic violence and housing).
168

Id.

169 Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006).
170 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(c)(3) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1437d(2)(5); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c)(9)(A) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); 42

U.S.C.A.

§ 1437f(o)(6)(B);

§ 1437f(d)(1)(B);

42

42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c)(9)(B);

U.S.C.A.

§ 1437f(o)(7)(C);

42 U.S.C.A.

42

U.S.C.A.

§ 1437f(o)(20)(A).
171 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d.
172 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(o).
173 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c),(d).
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types of supportive housing. 174 In addition, VAWA includes an
"actual and imminent threat" exception, which allows a public
housing authority to "terminate the tenancy of any tenant if the
public housing agency can demonstrate an actual and imminent
threat to other tenants or those employed at or providing service to the property if that tenant's tenancy is not
175
terminated."
The Fair Housing Act (FHA), which applies to both public
and private housing and prohibits housing discrimination on the
basis of sex, protects a broader class and arguably offers more
robust protection than VAWA.176 Because this Comment focuses
on sex-based discrimination in the context of domestic violence
rather than discrimination against domestic violence survivors
per se, it primarily examines the FHA.
To date, there have been few FHA challenges in the domestic
violence context, and many of the challenges that have been
raised have resulted in settlements with limited precedential
value. 177 In light of this legal vacuum, advocates should look to
alternatives to litigation, such as state legislation rendering domestic violence survivors a protected class and carving out exceptions for domestic violence survivors in landlord-tenant
provisions. Nevertheless, the success of FHA challenges to date
and the untapped potential for further challenges suggest that
FHA litigation remains a promising avenue for preventing and
remedying evictions and other forms of housing discrimination.
Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization
Act of 2005: Applicability to HUD Programs, 72 Fed. Reg. 12, 696 (Mar. 16,
174

2007).
175 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6)(E).
176 The Fair Housing Act makes it illegal "to refuse to sell or rent.. .or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C.A. 3604(a)
(West 2005).

See, e.g., Alvera v. C.B.M. Group, Case No. 01-857 (D. Or. 2001), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset-upload file457_33995.pdf (landlord's zero-tolerance policy for violence in rental units had disparate impact
on women, in violation of Fair Housing Act).
177
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Plaintiffs can bring both disparate impact and disparate treatment claims under the FHA,178 and can bring such claims affirmatively or as a defense to eviction.179
A.

Disparate Treatment

A plaintiff may prevail under a disparate treatment theory if
she can establish that she was treated differently from a similarly situated man. 180 Alternatively, in the absence of a comparator, she may prevail nevertheless by showing that her treatment
stemmed from gender stereotypes and therefore constituted in181
tentional sex-based discrimination.
In one of the few Fair Housing Act cases in the domestic violence arena that resulted in a published court opinion, plaintiff
Quinn Bouley, a tenant in rural Vermont, challenged her eviction under a disparate treatment theory. 182 After Ms. Bouley
was assaulted at home by an abusive husband, her landlord suggested turning to Christ for assistance. 8 3 Angrily, Ms. Bouley
responded that she did not wish to discuss religion with her
landlord. 184 Shortly thereafter, Ms. Bouley's landlord sent Ms.
Bouley an eviction letter, stating that she believed the violence
that had taken place in Ms. Bouley's unit would continue. 185 In
an FHA suit challenging the eviction as, inter alia, sex-based disA. WIDISS, supra note 160, at 3-5.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 3 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)
(treatment based on gender stereotypes is a form of intentional sex-based
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)). See also
Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304 (9th Cir. 1997) ("We apply
Title VII discrimination analysis in examining Fair Housing
Act.. .discrimination claims"); Larkin v. Michigan Dep't of Social Servs, 89
F.3d 285, 289 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Most courts applying the FHA...have analogized it to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.").
182 Bouley v. Young-Saborouin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675, 678 (D. Vt. 2005).
183 EMILY J. MARTIN & DEBORAH A. WIDISS, supra note 160, at 4.
178 EMILY J. MARTIN & DEBORAH
179
180
181

184
185

Id.
Id.
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crimination, Ms. Bouley argued that her landlord had employed
gender stereotypes in assuming that Ms. Bouley was not a genuine victim of domestic violence given her hostile attitude; her
landlord had assumed that "real" domestic violence survivors
were meek and submissive. 18 6 In 2005, the district court denied
defendant's motion for summary judgment,187 and shortly thereafter, the case settled. 188 While the court did not address Ms.
Bouley's allegation of stereotyping, the denial of summary judgment indicates favorable treatment of disparate claims resting
on the stereotyping of domestic violence survivors. 189
B.

Disparate Impact

To make out a prima facie case of housing discrimination
under a disparate impact theory, a plaintiff must show "that a
particular facially-neutral practice actually or predictably imposes a disproportionate burden upon members of the protected
class."190 In contrast to the Equal Protection Clause, the FHA
does not impose an intent requirement on plaintiffs alleging disparate impact. 191 Next, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that the challenged actions "furthered, in theory and in
practice, a legitimate, bona fide, governmental interest and that
no alternative would serve that interest with less discriminatory
effect." 192 In order to prevail once a defendant has established a
bona fide objective, a plaintiff must show that the defendant unreasonably failed to adopt an alternative policy that would serve
the same end in a less discriminatory manner. 93
186

Id.

187

Bouley, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675.

J. MARTIN & DEBORAH A. WIDISS, supra note 160, at 4.
Id.
190 Hack v. President and Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 98 (2d Cir.
2000) (stating legal standard for FHA violations).
191 Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934
(2d Cir. 1988).
192 Id. at 936.
188 EMILY
189

193 Hack, 237 F.3d at 101.
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Because women, as noted above, constitute 90 to 95% of domestic violence survivors,194 plaintiffs will have relatively little
difficulty making out a prima facie case of disparate impact by
claiming that "zero tolerance" policies and other practices that
penalize domestic violence survivors have a disparate impact on
women. To the extent that the categorical exclusion of domestic
violence survivors reduces violence on a property, a landlord
may be able to assert a "business necessity" defense for a zero
tolerance policy. However, in that event, plaintiffs can likely
counter that other policies would have served the same ends
with less discriminatory means. For example, a housing provider
could file a civil or criminal complaint against the batterer, help
a domestic violence survivor obtain and enforce a restraining order, improve security, or allow a survivor to transfer units, terminate a lease early, or change the locks in order to protect
95
herself from her abuser.1
A disparate impact theory proved successful in Alvera, 196 a
case that ultimately settled favorably for the plaintiff. In that
case, plaintiff Tiffani Alvera was brutally assaulted by her husband in her apartment. 97 When she subsequently obtained a restraining order and provided it to her landlord, she immediately
received an eviction notice, pursuant to the zero-tolerance policy of her housing development, Creekside Village Apartments. 198 Alvera challenged the zero-tolerance policy on
disparate impact grounds, and the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) found probable cause that the zero
tolerance policy contravened the FHA. 199 HUD and Alvera
brought action against the Creekside Village Apartments, and
supra note 12, at 2.
WIDISS, supra note 160, at 5.
196 Alvera v. C.B.M. Group, Case No. 01-857 (D. Or. 2001), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset-upload-file457_33995.pdf.
197 Id.
198 Tara M. Vrettos, supra note 166, at 98.
199 EMILY J. MARTIN & DEBORAH A. WIDISS, supra note 160, at 5.
194 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
195 EMILY

J.

MARTIN

& DEBORAH A.
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the case settled on terms favorable to Alvera, albeit non-binding
20 0
on outside parties.
Similarly, in Windsor v. Regency Property Management, Inc., a
domestic violence survivor prevailed in state court on a disparate impact challenge to a private landlord's refusal to rent to a
survivor of domestic violence under state legislation analogous
20 1
to the Fair Housing Act.
In Lewis v. North End Village et al., a domestic violence survivor brought a disparate impact suit against a private landlord
when she was evicted after her "guest," an abusive partner
against whom she had filed a restraining order, violated the restraining order and caused damage to her property. The case
settled on terms favorable to the plaintiff, marking the first settlement of its kind involving a private landlord. The settlement
stipulated not only that the landlord would cease to evict domestic violence survivors but also that it would provide early
lease termination to survivors who needed to relocate for safety
reasons. 202
In Warren v. Ypsilanti Housing Commission, a domestic violence survivor brought suit against a public housing authority to
challenge a "one-strike" policy under which she had been
evicted after being assaulted in her unit. 20 3 This case also settled
on favorable terms for the plaintiff and resulted in an agreement

by the housing authority to renounce its "one-strike"

policy.204

Id.
201 See Winsor v. Regency Property Mgm't, No. 94CV2349 (7th Cir. 1995).
202 Domestic Violence, Dating, Violence, Sexual Assault, and Stalking Policy
- Complaint Form, ACLU.ORG, http://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset-upload
_file871_34190.pdf.
203 See Warren v. Ypsilanti Housing Authority, Case No. 4:02-cv-40034 (E.D.
Mich. 2003).
200

204

See Id.
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Emergency Transfers

In 2008, Yolaunda Robinson, a public housing tenant, was
brutally attacked by her ex-boyfriend, who had found his way to
her apartment and forcibly gained entry. 20 5 In order to protect
herself and her children, Ms. Robinson requested a transfer to a
different unit, pursuant to the housing authority's policy of providing "administrative transfers" to "residents who are victims
of federal hate crimes or extreme harassment." 20 6 The housing
authority refused, maintaining that domestic violence was not
grounds for a transfer under the prevailing policy. 20 7 Ms. Robinson challenged this denial under both disparate impact and disparate treatment theories, arguing that the housing authority's
policy reflected intentional discrimination and imposed a disproportionate burden on domestic violence survivors. 20 8 However,
in denying plaintiff a preliminary injunction based on the merits
of her case, the court held that while the FHA prohibited the
denial of housing on the basis of gender, it did not extend to
emergency transfers. 20 9 Thus, the court refused to rely on FHA
cases in which plaintiffs had challenged the eviction of domestic
violence survivors on similar grounds. 2 0 Moreover, the court
held that the challenged policy was facially neutral and as such,
did not single out domestic violence survivors, even though the
housing authority had interpreted it to exclude domestic violence as grounds for an administrative transfer. 211 However,
even though the court denied the preliminary injunction, the

Robinson v. Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
39523, *2 (S.D. Ohio 2008).
206 Id. at *3.
207 Id.
208 Id. at *5.
205

210

Id. at *16.
Id.

211

Id.

209
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housing authority has since agreed to amend its policy to pro212
vide emergency transfers to victims of domestic violence.
Robinson creates an uphill battle for domestic violence survivors and their advocates challenging denials for safety transfers.
Nevertheless, the Robinson court's decision was fundamentally
flawed, and as such, should not close the door to future challenges of its kind. Contrary to the court's holding, the FHA,
which proscribes discrimination "in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling," 213 plainly applies to
emergency transfers that affect a tenant's level of safety in her
apartment. Moreover, the housing authority's refusal to characterize domestic violence as a form of "extreme harassment" or
alternatively, to place it on par with federal hate crimes, constitutes the same tacit acceptance of domestic violence that constitutes intentional discrimination in the police nonintervention
and employment contexts.
V.

CONCLUSION

Rather than aiding and empowering domestic violence survivors, societal practices frequently result in further oppression.
The stakes are high, and the results all too often fatal. This Comment demonstrates the viability of civil rights challenges in combating discrimination again domestic violence survivors in the
contexts of police nonintervention, employment, and housing.
Specifically, the Equal Protection Clause, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and the Fair Housing Act are powerful antidotes to a set of practices that, upon close examination, constitute veiled sex-based discrimination. While civil rights law is no
panacea, its promises outweigh its pitfalls, and as such, it is a
critical tool in combating domestic violence and its aftermath.

E-mail from Meliah Schulzman, National Housing Law Project, to Erica
Franklin (May 6, 2009) (on file with author).
213 42 USC § 3604(a)(b).
212
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